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Pricing Justice
THE WASTEFUL ENTERPRISE OF AMERICA’S BAIL
SYSTEM
“Among the great untold stories of our time is this one:
the last half of the twentieth century saw America’s criminal
justice system unravel.”1
INTRODUCTION
At any given time in America, approximately 70% of all
inmates in state and local jails are pretrial detainees.2 The large
majority of these individuals are charged with nonviolent
offenses and remain incarcerated after arrest—before even going
to trial—simply because they cannot afford to pay the bail
required for their release.3 Wealth-based practices like bail
1 WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THECOLLAPSE OFAMERICANCRIMINAL JUSTICE 1 (2011).
2 MELISSA NEAL, JUSTICE POLICY INST., BAIL FAIL: WHY THE U.S. SHOULD
END THE PRACTICE OF USING MONEY FOR BAIL 3 (2012), http://www.justicepolicy.org/
uploads/justicepolicy/documents/bailfail.pdf [https://perma.cc/73UE-GUDP].
3 While jails do house individuals charged with serious, violent crimes,
approximately 75% of the population of both sentenced offenders and pretrial detainees
are in jail for nonviolent traffic, property, drug, or public order offenses. DORIS J. JAMES,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROFILE OF JAIL INMATES, 2002, at 3 (2004), http://www.
bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pji02.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZL4B-KAK3]. Five out of six defendants
are jailed pretrial because they cannot afford assigned bail amounts. THOMAS H. COHEN &
BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRETRIAL RELEASE OF FELONY
DEFENDANTS IN STATE COURTS 1 (2007), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/prfdsc.
pdf [https://perma.cc/L459-5L4B]. In most cases, high bail amounts reflect a judgment
that the defendant is dangerous—and therefore must be detained to prevent future
crime. In others, high bail amounts may reflect the judge’s concern over the defendant’s
lack of ties to the community. See, e.g., Alysia Santo, Kentucky’s Protracted Struggle to
Get Rid of Bail, THEMARSHALL PROJECT (Nov. 12, 2015), https://www.themarshallproject.
org/2015/11/12/kentucky-s-protracted-struggle-to-get-rid-of-bail#.wtRAv0r71 [https://perma.
cc/9BEV-EEJB] (noting that judges in Kentucky often cite concerns of failure to appear at
trial or danger to the community when setting bail for nonviolent defendants who have
been rated low- or moderate-risk by pretrial assessment agencies, while another judge set
a mere “$10,000 bond on a murder case”). It is likely safe to assume that low bail amounts
at the state level are typically imposed on nondangerous defendants, and the statistics for
this low-bond defendant class are compelling. See Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Address at the National Symposium on Pretrial Justice (June 1, 2011), http://
www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2011/ag-speech-110601.html [https://perma.cc/Z6U7-
LXES] (observing that many pretrial detainees have been “charged with crimes ranging
from petty theft to public drug use,” and that they are detained “because they simply
cannot afford to post the bail required—very often, just a few hundred dollars—to return
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create a two-tiered system of justice in the United States, where
regardless of factual guilt or innocence, a defendant’s ability to
assist attorneys in mounting a defense against accusations of
criminal conduct and withstand prosecutorial pressures to enter a
guilty plea is predominately dependent upon their financial
standing.4 Meanwhile, the time spent in pretrial detention
exacts not only a steep and long-term toll on an indigent
defendant’s productivity, family unity, and community well-
being but also an enormous cost on American taxpayers.5 The
policies governing criminal procedure should thus be amended to
ensure that poor defendants are afforded the same freedom and
mobility enjoyed by those with means, as opposed to our current
system which predicates access to justice on the ability to pay an
oft arbitrarily set bail amount.
home until their day in court arrives”); AM. BAR ASS’N, STATE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION
PROJECT 2 (2011), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/criminal_
justice/spip_handouts.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/H472-M3UR] [hereinafter
ABA STUDY] (“Two thirds of the 500,000 individuals incarcerated in jail and awaiting
trial are low bail risk . . . pos[ing] no significant risk to themselves or the community, as
well as representing a low risk of flight.”). A defendant’s income affects both whether he
ends up in jail and the length of his pretrial detention. See MARY T. PHILLIPS, N.Y.C.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, INC., PRETRIAL DETENTION AND CASE OUTCOMES, PART 1:
NONFELONY CASES 9, 22 (2007) (noting in an empirical study of New York City nonfelony
defendants in 2003–2004 that “[e]very $1,000 increase in bail amount was accompanied
by an average increase of 2.3 days in pretrial detention time” and that “a lack of family
and community ties, as well as lack of income, led to longer [pretrial] detention”).
4 See, e.g., Thomas E. Scott, Pretrial Detention Under the Bail Reform Act of
1984: An Empirical Analysis, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 15 (1989) (“Both in 1987 and in
1988 approximately 85 percent of all detainees were ultimately convicted of a criminal
charge.”); Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2463, 2493 (2004) (noting that “[d]etained defendants find it harder to meet and
strategize with their lawyers and to track down witnesses”).
5 In New York City—where the average length of stay for a pretrial detainee
is 176 days—it costs “approximately $45,000 annually to house a single pretrial
detainee.” Rosa Goldensohn, Average NYC Jail Stay Is 3 Times Longer than Reported,
DOC Commish Says, DNA INFO (July 22, 2015), https://www.dnainfo.com/new-york/201
50722/east-elmhurst/average-stay-at-rikers-is-3-times-longer-than-reported-doc-commish-
says [https://perma.cc/CC3B-7XRA]; ABA STUDY, supra note 3, at 5. Even when pretrial
detention does not lead to a conviction, many detainees lose their jobs even if they are
jailed for a short period of time; without income, the individual and his family may also
fall behind on payments and lose housing, healthcare, transportation, and other
necessities. See, e.g., ABA STUDY, supra note 3, at 5 (listing “job loss, inability to pay
child support and eviction” as “collateral consequences” of pretrial confinement); Marc
Miller & Martin Guggenheim, Pretrial Detention and Punishment, 75 MINN. L. REV.
335, 424 (1990) (“The differences in the ability of the defendant [released pretrial] to
work, maintain a family life, and prepare for the defense of criminal charges are
substantial.”). More broadly, the removal of productive workers from the labor pool
negatively affects the economy. See Holder, supra note 3 (noting that nonviolent
defendants “could be released . . . and allowed to pursue or maintain employment, and
participate in educational opportunities and their normal family lives—without risk of
endangering their fellow citizens or fleeing from justice”).
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Oddly enough, the fact that bail systems perpetuate
injustice is not a newly discovered one.6 Rather, decades of
research have firmly established the “basic contours”7 of the
problem—when bail is set without regard to an individual’s
ability to afford the amount required for release, only a small
number of defendants can avoid jail time by paying it at
arraignment.8 Nevertheless, lawmakers have by and large failed
to introduce any meaningful reforms to the system.9
Every so often, however, tragedy will call attention to
the inequities of cash bail and put pressure on lawmakers to
act. The story of Sandra Bland,10 who died under mysterious
circumstances in her Texas jail cell after failing to pay the $500
necessary for her release, led to particular scrutiny of bail
“since it clearly burdens the poor disproportionately, without
6 See, e.g., THOMASHOBBES, LEVIATHAN 146 (1651) (observing that, “sometimes,
as men’s manners are, justice cannot be had without money”); see generallyWayne L. Morse
& Ronald H. Beattie, Editorial, Survey of the Administration of Criminal Justice in Oregon,
11 OR. L. REV. 173, 173–74 (1932) (demonstrating that a defendant’s status—whether out
on bail or in jail—had a significant relationship to the case disposition, and those in jail
received a substantially less favorable disposition); Caleb Foote, The Coming
Constitutional Crisis in Bail: I, 113 U. PENN. L. REV. 959 (1965) (noting that, despite the
Supreme Court’s action in the areas of “search and seizure and indigents’ right to
counsel,” the judiciary has yet to address the pervasive problem that money bail presents
for the poor defendant in court); Anne Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial Detention, 39 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 641 (1964) (“Previous studies of bail have indicated that an accused who has been
detained in jail between his arraignment and the final adjudication of his case is more
likely to receive a criminal conviction or jail sentence than an accused who has been free
on bail. Thus, a person’s inability or unwillingness to post bail may result in more than a
temporary deprivation of his liberty.” (footnotes omitted)).
7 Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to Be Monitored, 123
YALE L.J. 1344, 1346–47 (2014).
8 See MARY T. PHILLIPS, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, INC., A
DECADE OF BAIL RESEARCH IN NEW YORK CITY 110 (2012) (observing the low monetary
amount of bail in “the small proportion of cases with a defendant who was able to post
it at arraignment (10% of nonfelony cases and 7% of felony cases.)”).
9 See infra Section III.B (critiquing recently proposed alternatives to cash
bail in the states).
10 Sandra Bland was pulled over in Waller County, Texas on July 10, 2015, for
failing to signal a lane change. David Montgomery, Sandra Bland Was Threatened with
Taser, Police Video Shows, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/22/
us/sandra-bland-was-combative-texas-arrest-report-says.html [https://perma.cc/H267-K6
JA]. A police dashboard-camera video of the encounter shows an escalating confrontation
after Ms. Bland refused the officer’s request to extinguish her cigarette. Id. At one point,
the officer threatened to forcibly remove Ms. Bland from her vehicle with a taser, saying,
“I will light you up.” Id. Ms. Bland was then arrested on a charge of assaulting a public
servant, and her bail was set at $5000. Nathan Koppel & Ana Campoy, Trooper in Sandra
Bland Case Is Under Criminal Probe, WALL ST. J. (July 22, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/trooper-in-sandra-bland-case-is-under-criminal-probe-1437589219 [https://perma.cc/
6QEV-PRW8]. She was jailed while her family attempted to secure the 10% ($500)
necessary to pay a bail bondsman for her release. Clifford Ward, Failure to Be Bonded Out
Led Sandra Bland to Suicide, Jail Officials Allege, CHI. TRIBUNE (Nov. 12, 2015), http://
www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-sandra-bland-court-motions-met-20151112-story.html.
Three days later, Sandra Bland, age twenty-eight, was found hanged in her jail cell from a
trash can liner. Koppel & Campoy, supra.
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any greater assurance of public safety.”11 Following the shocking
suicide of Kalief Browder, the Bronx teen accused of stealing a
backpack and held on bail for three years before his case was
dismissed,12 New Yorkers were forced to learn what the state’s
indigent, minority, and immigrant residents13 have known for
11 Koppel & Campoy, supra note 10; Margaret Talbot, The Case Against Cash
Bail, NEW YORKER (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-case-
against-cash-bail [https://perma.cc/TU6W-9782].
12 Kalief Browder was arrested in the Bronx in 2010, at age sixteen, for a
crime he insisted he did not commit. He then spent over one thousand days on Rikers
Island awaiting trial, because he could not afford the $3000 bail necessary for his
pretrial release. Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law, NEW YORKER (Oct. 6, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/06/before-the-law [https://perma.cc/7XV3-C
82L] [hereinafter Gonnerman, Before the Law]. During that time, Mr. Browder suffered
through approximately two years in solitary confinement, where he tried to end his life
on multiple occasions. Jennifer Gonnerman, Kalief Browder, 1993–2015, NEW YORKER
(June 7, 2015), http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/kalief-browder-1993-2015
[https://perma.cc/86ET-MSJ5]. In his court case, there were more than ten adjournments
due to the prosecution needing more time to build a case against him. Gonnerman,
Before the Law, supra. It was not until three years into the case that a judge, after
pressing the prosecutor and proactively seeking to resolve the case, learned that the
prosecution had lost contact with its key witness. Gonnerman, Before the Law, supra.
On May 30, 2013, after more than thirty court dates, Mr. Browder was released from
Rikers Island without ever having been convicted of a crime. Id. Two years later, on
June 6, 2015, Kalief Browder, twenty-two, died at his family home in the Bronx.
Michael Schwirtz & Michael Winerip, Kalief Browder, Held at Riker’s Island for 3
Years Without Trial, Commits Suicide, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/06/09/nyregion/kalief-browder-held-at-rikers-island-for-3-years-without-trial-
commits-suicide.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/6TM5-DFVB].
13 Under the relevant U.S. laws, a conviction for certain removable offenses
will trigger mandatory detention and deportation or removal proceedings for
noncitizens—including lawful permanent residents (green card holders). Individuals
who are subjected to mandatory detention are not entitled to bond hearings and, as a
result, languish in immigrant detention centers, jails, and prisons for prolonged periods
of time while awaiting their deportation hearings. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7343, 102 Stat. 4181, 4470 (1988) (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (2012)) (requiring detention of a specified class of noncitizens,
depriving federal immigration officials of the authority to release those individuals on
bond pending proceedings, and authorizing indefinite detention without a bond
hearing). On November 30, 2016, the United States Supreme Court heard oral
argument in Jennings v. Rodriguez. Kevin Johnson, Argument Analysis: Immigrant
Detention and the Constitution, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 1, 2016, 11:28 AM), http://www.
scotusblog.com/2016/12/argument-analysis-immigrant-detention-and-the-constitution/
[https://perma.cc/WRH6-F522] [hereinafter Johnson, Immigrant Detention and the
Constitution]. This class-action challenge to immigration detentions raises questions
about whether immigrants, like virtually any U.S. citizen placed in criminal or civil
detention, must be guaranteed a bond hearing. Kevin Johnson, Argument Preview: The
Constitutionality of Immigrant Detention, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 23, 2016, 10:15 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/11/argument-preview-the-constitutionality-of-immigrant-
detention/ [https://perma.cc/3FFB-CRRK]. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed a district court injunction that generally requires bond hearings every six months
for certain classes of immigrant detainees. Id. In October 2015, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals came to a similar conclusion, finding in Lora v. Shanahan that immigrants with
criminal convictions have a right to a bond hearing. Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601,
613–15 (2d Cir. 2015). The Supreme Court’s decision in the Rodriguez class action will
dictate whether that practice applies to immigrant detainees nationwide. Johnson,
Argument Preview: The Constitutionality of Immigrant Detention, supra.
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years: the bail-bond enterprise defies logic and reason, and
“perpetuates injustice in the name of the law.”14
Shortly thereafter, the New York State Senate introduced
“Kalief ’s Law” to make sure “cases go to trial within a reasonable
timeframe,”15 and New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio announced
a $17.8 million initiative expanding the use of risk assessment
tools that allow judges to keep certain defendants under
“supervised release”—and thus out of jail—pending their day in
court.16 “I wish, I deeply wish, we hadn’t lost him—but he did not
die in vain,” de Blasio said.17 Under supervised release programs,
a small percentage of approved defendants are released pretrial
and must check in with assigned caseworkers in person and by
phone.18 Similar pilot projects in Queens and Manhattan have
shown promising results,19 but they have narrowly tailored
14 Robert F. Kennedy, U.S. Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Address to the
Academy of Trial Lawyers of Allegheny County (June 1, 1964), https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/01/20/06-01-1964.pdf [https://perma.cc/AM45-FEFM].
15 Daniel L. Squadron, Senate Bill S5988A, N.Y. STATE SENATE, https://www.
nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2015/s5988/amendment/original [https://perma.cc/ZQ77-G
83V]; see Kalief ’s Law, S.B. 5988, 238th Cong., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015). Kalief ’s Law
was introduced on June 16, 2015. Id. On June 1, 2016, the New York State Assembly
voted to approve the bill by an overwhelming margin of 138–2. Stephon Johnson, State
Assembly Passes ‘Kalief ’s Law’ to Reform Pretrial Detention, N.Y. AMSTERDAM NEWS
(June 9, 2016), http://amsterdamnews.com/news/2016/jun/09/state-assembly-passes-kaliefs-
law-reform-pretrial-/ [https://perma.cc/N7CN-7LVY]. Senator Daniel Squadron, co-sponsor
of the bill, attempted to force a Senate vote on the proposed legislation—by filing a
motion which requires a bill be placed on a committee agenda within forty-five days of
filing. Daniel L. Squadron, Squadron Applauds Assembly Passing “Kalief ’s Law” to Fix
NY’s Speedy Trial Law, N.Y. STATE SENATE (June 2, 2016), https://www.nysenate.gov/
newsroom/articles/daniel-l-squadron/squadron-applauds-assembly-passing-kaliefs-law-
fix-nys-speedy [https://perma.cc/WG9P-6D8L]. The Senate Republicans refused to honor
the motion, however, and Kalief ’s Law died in the Senate Codes Committee in June
2016. Id. The legislation was once again passed by the State Assembly in a unanimous,
bipartisan vote on February 14, 2017, and now awaits a vote by the Senate Majority.
Daniel L. Squadron, Squadron Applauds Unanimous Assembly ‘Kalief ’s Law’ Passage
to Fix Speedy Trial Law, N.Y. STATE SENATE (Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.nysenate.gov/
newsroom/articles/daniel-l-squadron/squadron-applauds-unanimous-assembly-kaliefs-
law-passage-fix [https://perma.cc/2VG6-6S6J]; see also Kalief ’s Law, Assemb. B. 3055-
A, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017).
16 Andrew Keshner, City Select Agencies to Supervise Released Offenders, N.Y.L.J.
ONLINE (Jan. 15, 2016), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202747163647/City-
Selects-Agencies-to-Supervise-Released-Offenders?mcode=0&curindex=0&curpage=2.
17 Jillian Jorgensen, City Needs ‘Some Type of Bail Reform,’ de Blasio Says
After Kalief Browder Suicide, OBSERVER (June 8, 2015), http://observer.com/2015/06/
city-needs-some-type-of-bail-reform-de-blasio-says-after-kalief-browder-suicide/ [https://
perma.cc/ZTS4-297W].
18 Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 13, 2015), http://ny
times.com/2015/08/16/magazine/the-bail-trap.html [https://perma.cc/8MLK-YTMR].
19 Since the Queens Supervised Release Program began operations in August
2009, through October 2012, there was a “total of 833 clients who exited the program,”
over 87% of whom successfully satisfied supervision “requirements as of the date they
exited the program.” FREDA F. SOLOMON, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, INC.,
CJA’S QUEENS COUNTY SUPERVISED RELEASE PROGRAM: IMPACT ON COURT PROCESSING
AND OUTCOMES 1–3 (2013), https://www.pretrial.org/download/research/Queens%20County
%20Supervised%20Release%20Program-%20Impact%20on%20Court%20Processing%20ad
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eligibility requirements based on the nature of the crimes
charged, previous criminal history, the risk of failure-to-appear,
and verified ties to the local community.20 Kalief Browder, for
example, would not have been eligible because the crime he was
accused of—stealing a backpack—was charged as a violent
felony.21 And even with the recent expansion of supervised release
in New York City, still, only 8% of the 45,500 individuals held on
bail each year will avoid pretrial incarceration.22
This is why, in October 2015, New York State’s then-
Chief Judge, Jonathan Lippmann, announced a series of
administrative reforms intended to reduce the number of indigent
pretrial detainees.23 The changes—which include an automatic
review of all bail determinations, and, for felonies, require
periodic judicial review of the prosecution’s case and readiness
for trial—came after Judge Lippmann’s proposed bail statute
%20Outcomes%20-%20CJA%202013.pdf [https://perma.cc/DK6D-UN7N]; see Press Release,
The City of N.Y. Office of the Mayor, Mayor de Blasio Announces Citywide Rollout of $17.8
Million Bail Alternative Program (Apr. 8, 2016), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/
news/336-16/mayor-de-blasio-citywide-rollout-17-8-million-bail-alternative-program [https://
perma.cc/A2Y8-8J9B].
20 MARY T. PHILLIPS & RAYMOND P. CALIGIURE, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE
AGENCY, ANNUAL REPORT 2013, at 42–45 (2014), http://www.nycja.org/lwdcms/doc-view.
php?module=reports&module_id=1410&doc_name=doc [https://perma.cc/B9FD-TWXR];
SOLOMON, supra note 19, at 1.
21 Mr. Browder was charged with robbery in the second degree, grand
larceny, and assault. Dana Ford, Man Jailed as Teen Without Conviction Commits
Suicide, CNN (June 15, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/07/us/kalief-browder-dead/;
Gonnerman, Before the Law, supra note 12. At the time, robbery in the second degree
under New York state law qualified as a crime of violence. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 160.10
(McKinney 2016) (classifying second-degree robbery as a class C felony); N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 70.02 (McKinney 2016) (defining class C felonies as violent crimes). The
supervised release programs in New York City are an option for judges in cases
prosecuted for select nonviolent felony charges. SOLOMON, supra note 19, at 1.
22 The current city-funded pilot programs that have operated in Queens and
Manhattan since 2009 and 2013 (respectively) have the capacity to supervise 1100
pretrial defendants. Andrew Keshner, City, DA Pledge $17.8 Million to Expand
Supervised Release, N.Y.L.J. (July 9, 2015), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=120
2731598195?germane=1202747163647. With the citywide expansion of the programs,
approximately 3400 individuals will be eligible for supervised release. Andrew
Keshner, City Selects Agencies to Supervise Released Offenders, N.Y.L.J. (Jan. 15,
2016), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202747163647/City-Selects-Agencies-to-
Supervise-Released-Offenders?mcode=0&curindex=0&curpage=2. While only about 14%
of individuals arraigned in New York City are held on bail each year, that amounts to
about 45,500 individuals. Press Release, The City of N.Y. Office of the Mayor, Mayor de
Blasio Announces $17.8 Million to Reduce Unnecessary Jail Time for People Waiting for
Trial (July 8, 2015), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/471-15/mayor-de-blasio-
17-8-million-reduce-unnecessary-jail-time-people-waiting-trial [https://perma.cc/33D2-9G
WS]. Thus, with the expansion of supervised release, approximately 3400 of the 45,500
individuals held on bail each year will be released through the program. This works out to
roughly 8%.
23 Press Release, Hon. Lawrence K. Marks, N.Y. State Unified Court System,
Chief Judge Jonathan Lippmann Announces Series of Reforms to Address Injustices of
NY’s Current Bail System (Oct. 1, 2015), https://www.nycourts.gov/press/PDFs/PR15_
13.pdf [https://perma.cc/S92Y-AYLE].
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failed to gain support in the state assembly for two years.24
Absent legislative reform, such measures “might avert another
tragedy like the death of Mr. Browder,” Judge Lippman said.25
Neither administrative rulemaking nor the expansion of
supervised release can solve the problems created by wealth-
based systems in court, however. The legitimate purpose of
ensuring the accused’s return for trial has been distorted into a
systematic injustice—the policies that punish poor defendants
while the wealthy walk free are not unique to New York.26
Though most politicians today court voters “not by fighting
crime but by talking about it,”27 a handful of jurisdictions have
attempted to reduce their reliance upon monetized conditions
of release by adopting risk assessment tools to guide judges’ bail
decisions.28 Ultimately, however, these reforms, while well-
intentioned, obfuscate the goal of individualized and equal justice
in court. By grounding bail decisions in inflexible criteria—like
socioeconomic background, neighborhood of residence, or
education level—risk assessment tools exacerbate disparities in
the United States’ criminal justice system.
This note argues that logic, constitutional infirmity, and
public policy all weigh heavily against wealth-based pretrial
systems. In light of these concerns, neither risk assessment tools
nor supervised release programs offer a targeted solution to the
24 Id.; see also Assemb. B. 6799, 2013–2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2013).
25 James C. McKinley, Jr., State’s Chief Judge, Citing ‘Injustice,’ Lays Out
Plans to Alter Bail System, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/
02/nyregion/jonathan-lippman-bail-incarceration-new-york-state-chief-judge.html [https://
perma.cc/4QM5-LXM2].
26 See NEAL, supra note 2, at 3. But See Ann E. Marimow, When It Comes to
Pretrial Release, Few Other Jurisdictions Do It D.C.’s Way, WASH. POST (July 4, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/when-it-comes-to-pretrial-release-few-
other-jurisdictions-do-it-dcs-way/2016/07/04/8eb52134-e7d3-11e5-b0fd-073d5930a7b7_story.
html [https://perma.cc/NF6K-E5MA].
27 STUNTZ, supra note 1, at 188.
28 As of early 2017, cities in Alabama, Kansas, Missouri, Mississippi, and
Louisiana have amended their pretrial practices to end the use of secured money bail
for new arrestees. Ending the American Money Bail System, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER
LAW, http://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/wp/current-cases/ending-the-american-money-bail-
system/ [https://perma.cc/646B-UXWZ]. Arizona, Colorado, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland,
and New Jersey have introduced “evidence-based risk assessment” tools that encourage
the release of arrestees without money bail or surety, except under certain circumstances.
Ovetta Wiggins & Ann E. Marimow, Maryland’s Highest Court Overhauls the State’s
Cash-Based Bail System, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
local/md-politics/maryland-highest-court-overhauls-the-states-cash-based-bail-system/201
7/02/07/36188114-ed78-11e6-9973-c5efb7ccfb0d_story.html [https://perma.cc/ZMF2-ZXQA];
Lorelei Laird, Court Systems Rethink the Use of Financial Bail, Which Some Say Penalizes
the Poor, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 1, 2016), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/courts_are_
rethinking_bail [https://perma.cc/PN22-P5EW]; Indiana High Court Orders Most
Arrestees Released Without Bail, WANE.COM (Sept. 7, 2016), http://wane.com/2016/09/07/
indiana-high-court-orders-most-arrestees-released-without-bail/ [https://perma.cc/99HN-
XAW6].
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problem posed by cash bail in court. Moreover, constitutionally
grounded principles like federalism and the separation of powers
require the legislature—not the judiciary—to actively seek to
amend discriminatory policies governing bail-setting and pretrial
release. And because Congress has long since done away with
these issues at the federal level, the responsibility rests with state
lawmakers alone, who ought to embrace policies that eliminate
the role of finances, incarceration, and oversupervision in pretrial
procedure. The deprivation of liberty should be the exception—not
the rule—and detention should be allowed only in cases where a
judge has made an individualized determination that no
reasonable set of conditions can allay concerns of failure-to-
appear or community safety.
Part I traces the evolution of bail and pretrial policy in
the United States. Part II notes the serious disadvantages of
the current bail system employed in New York City and the
majority of jurisdictions nationwide. Part III documents the
efforts already undertaken by certain state courts and
legislatures to mitigate the harmful consequences of cash bail.
It critiques these so-called alternatives to cash bail, focusing on
both documented and theoretical shortcomings of pretrial
supervised release programs. Part IV explores various avenues
for achieving the oft-conflicting goals of crime prevention and
pretrial liberty. It recommends an approach to penal policy and
bail decision making that is based not only on heuristic
methods of measuring cost and benefit but also the normative
principles of good governance and jurisprudence that have
historically justified society’s use of detention.29
I. THEHISTORY AND PURPOSE OF BAIL
At common law, bail was originally conceived as an
emancipatory mechanism wherein judges were required to
release the accused prior to appearing for trial, relying on their
29 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE
UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 8 (Jeremy Travis et al. eds.,
2014) (“The jurisprudence of punishment and theories of social policy have sought to
limit public harm by appealing to long-standing principles of fairness and shared social
membership. . . . [A]s policy makers and the public consider the implications of [the
causes and consequences of growing incarceration rates in the United States,] . . . they
also should consider the . . . principles whose application would constrain the use of
incarceration: Proportionality: [c]riminal offenses should be sentenced in proportion to
their seriousness[;] . . . Citizenship: [t]he conditions and consequences of imprisonment
should not be so severe or lasting as to violate one’s fundamental status as a member of
society[;] Social justice: [p]risons should be instruments of justice, and as such their
collective effect should be to promote and not undermine society’s aspirations for a fair
distribution of rights, resources, and opportunities.”).
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good word and that of their relatives, in addition to collateral,
such as property or bond, to ensure defendants’ return to court.30
Throughout the Middle Ages, however, judges learned that the
monetary amount of a bond could serve to detain a defendant
indefinitely and began setting impossibly high bail as a means of
pretrial punishment, thereby thwarting the purpose of the law
on presumptive release.31 Similarly, the United States’ system of
bail and associated pretrial policies were designed solely to
prevent the accused from fleeing the jurisdiction before being
brought to trial.32 Increasingly, however, many judges deemed
pretrial detainees a threat to public safety and set high bail to
keep them in jail.33 This practice, known as “preventive
detention,” represented a marked shift away from the basic
premise of bail. Critics have repeatedly highlighted the
problematic judicial discretion and insufficient constitutional
protections for individual liberty34 inherent in this predictive
process and suggested better approaches to bail-setting and
pretrial practice.35 Notwithstanding such recommendations,
pretrial detainees charged with nonviolent offenses, who pose no
risk of flight, continue to comprise the majority of inmates in
America’s jails.36
30 TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE ET AL., PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., THE HISTORY OF
BAIL AND PRETRIAL RELEASE 2, 6 (2010), https://www.pretrial.org/download/pji-reports/
PJI-History%20of%20Bail%20Revised.pdf [https://perma.cc/JY6L-3AMH].
31 Id. at 3.
32 William F. Duker, The Right to Bail: A Historical Inquiry, 42 ALB. L. REV.
33, 68–69 (1977) (“The function of bail is . . . limited to insuring the presence of a
defendant before the court.”); David J. McCarthy, Jr. & Jeanne J. Wahl, The District of
Columbia Bail Project: An Illustration of Experimentation and a Brief for Change, 53
GEO. L.J. 675, 715 (1965) (“[T]he purpose of bail is to ensure that the accused will
appear in court . . . not to prevent the commission of crime.”); Kennedy, supra note 14,
at 1 (explaining that the “institution of bail [in the United States] originated in
medieval England. Our Bill of Rights, in the Eighth Amendment, prohibits excessive
bail; and the right to bail is guaranteed in the Judiciary Act of 1789.”).
33 The Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966 did not expressly permit judges to
consider an individual’s potential risk to community safety or future dangerousness in
making the release decision. See EVIE LOTZE ET AL., PRETRIAL SERVS. RES. CTR., THE
PRETRIAL SERVICES REFERENCE BOOK 11 (1999). However, by 1999, it was reported
that “at least 44 states and the District of Columbia ha[d] statutes that list community
safety as well as the risk of failure to appear as being appropriate considerations” to be
weighed in the pretrial release decision. Id. at 12.
34 See, e.g., Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1352
(2008) (“No one doubts that the government infringes liberty when it physically
incarcerates individuals.”).
35 John V. Ryan, The Last Days of Bail, 58 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY &
POLICE SCI. 542, 548 (1967) (“Although it has never been proven, there have been
repeated suggestions that the bail setter often sets bail with the intention of keeping a
defendant in jail to protect society or a certain individual. That this manipulation of
the bail system takes place is practically unprovable, since the bail setter has such
wide discretion.” (footnote omitted)); see, e.g., Shima Baradaran, Restoring the
Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 767–70 (2011).
36 Holder, supra note 3.
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These inmates are the unfortunate byproducts of the
long-standing reliance on cash bail in the United States’
courts;37 individuals have always been required to post some
form of collateral38 to incentivize appearance at trial.39 But the
continued reliance on cash bail—a procedural relic held over from
a time in our nation’s history when the expanse of unsettled
territory offered ample opportunity to flee, and the concept of
mass incarceration was yet to be actualized—is unreasonable,
imprudent, and unnecessary.40
Notably, it was during an era of growth and development
that the United States saw an increased role for commercial bail
bond companies.41 It was reasonable and necessary, then, to
require an individual or third party to post collateral to ensure
appearance at trial.42 As America’s uninhabited territories
transformed into diverse urban areas, however, so too did the
underlying purpose of bail evolve; today, it is less of a tool for
keeping the accused out of jail pretrial, and more of a deadfall
for the indigent.43 Even the services of bail bondsmen are often
out of reach for poor defendants; when bail is set at relatively
small amounts, commercial bond companies cannot make
enough of a profit to make it worth their while and will reject
the would-be client’s case.44
37 See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 10 (1967) (stating that “[t]he persistence of
money bail can best be explained not by its stated purpose but by the belief of police,
prosecutors, and courts that the best way to keep a defendant from committing more
crimes before trial is to set bail so high that he cannot obtain his release”); Robert F.
Kennedy, U.S. Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Address to the Criminal Law Section of the
American Bar Association 3 (Aug. 10, 1964), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/
ag/legacy/2011/01/20/08-10-1964.pdf [https://perma.cc/DYW7-4SXN] (noting that bail
poses a difficult problem to the poor who “must stay in jail because, bluntly, they
cannot afford to pay for their freedom”).
38 Duker, supra note 32, at 41 (noting that in the early English criminal system,
these requirements existed because imprisonment was “costly and troublesome” (quoting 2
SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
584 (2d ed. 1968))).
39 Duker, supra note 32, at 70 (citing Consol. Expl. & Fin. Co. v. Musgrave (1900)
1 Ch. 31 (Eng.)) (noting that the reliance on monetary sureties in the U.K.’s pretrial system
was intended “to prevent the accused from disappearing”). Duker explains that “[t]his
doctrine was readily absorbed into American jurisprudence.” Id. at 71.
40 SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 30, at 6–8.
41 See Adam Liptak, Illegal Globally, Bail for Profit Remains in U.S., N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 29, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/29/us/29bail.html [https://perma.
cc/FJE6-GLBL] (“America’s open frontier and entrepreneurial spirit injected an innovation
into the [bail] process: by the early 1800s, private businesses were allowed to post bail in
exchange for payments from the defendants and the promise that they would hunt down the
defendants and return them if they failed to appear.”).
42 SCHNACKE ET AL., supra note 30, at 4–7.
43 Pinto, supra note 18.
44 Id. Individuals who cannot raise the full bail amount have the option of
using a commercial bail bondsman to secure their release, who can elect to secure the
accused’s pretrial release for a fee—“most often ten percent of the total bail amount.”
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A. Wealth-Based Forms of Pretrial Release
When making bail determinations, judicial officers must
undertake the daunting task of predicting the likelihood that
an accused person will commit another crime, hurt someone, or
flee the jurisdiction before their next court date.45 In some
jurisdictions, judges set bail amounts according to the seriousness
of the charges alone. Elsewhere, officials might weigh a variety of
factors such as criminal record, employment status, and
substance-abuse history. Notably, neither approach requires
that bail be set in accordance with defendants’ ability to
actually afford the cash-bond, fine, or fee payment imposed;
only at the federal level are judicial officers expressly forbidden
from setting a financial condition that results in the pretrial
detention of the person accused.46
So long as state law allows bail to be set,47 there are
several ways an eligible defendant may obtain release after
arrest. In addition to personal bond—“cash bail”—and
commercial surety bond, or bail bondsmen, other options for
release include: (1) deposit bond, or, requiring a defendant to
pay “a percentage of the bail amount (usually 10 percent) with
the understanding that fail[ure] to appear . . . will make them
liable for the full bail amount”; and (2) property bond, which,
“[i]n lieu of cash,” requires an individual to “provide a
deed . . . to allow the courts to” place a lien on their property
“for the value of the bond amount.”48 Including nonmonetized
means of release, judges in certain jurisdictions may have as
many as nine options available for setting bail.49
Despite the various means for assuring appearance in
court, there remains a steadfast reliance upon those wealth-based
Tracy Velázquez et al., Bailing on Justice: The Dysfunctional System of Using Money to
Buy Pretrial Freedom, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Nov. 15, 2012), https://www.prisonlegal
news.org/news/2012/nov/15/bailing-on-justice-the-dysfunctional-system-of-using-money-to-
buy-pretrial-freedom [https://perma.cc/MB7A-HC2F].
45 See infra note 73.
46 Federal law forbids the practice of setting bail in amounts that defendants
are unable to afford: “The judicial officer may not impose a financial condition that
results in the pretrial detention of the person.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(B)(xiv)(2) (2012).
47 In accordance with the various laws of the states and jurisdictions, judicial
officers may be required to impose detention for certain enumerated offenses, or due to
concerns for public safety; conversely, many states have laws regarding the imposition
of the least restrictive conditions of release. NEAL, supra note 2, at 7, 24. About twenty-
eight states allow a denial of bail “for charges other than capital offenses with
rationales that vary greatly.” Id. at 7. Roughly “21 states have laws disallowing the
detainment of people for charges other than capital offenses, and at least two states—
Alaska and Tennessee—do not allow courts to deny bail even for capital offenses.” Id.
48 Id. at 9.
49 Id. at 7, 9.
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conditions of release that present an insurmountable obstacle to
freedom for poor defendants. As bail practices have developed
state to state, the use of nonmonetized conditions of release have
become “vanishingly rare,” and the accused can usually obtain
pretrial release in just two ways: post the entire amount at
arraignment “or pay a commercial bail bondsman to do so.”50
The controversial role of the commercial bail bond
industry in the United States’ criminal justice system has
created a subtext to the ongoing debate about bail versus
supervised release. In many jurisdictions, bail bondsmen have
responded to the proposed growth of pretrial services programs
by launching discrediting ad campaigns to convince citizens that
commercial surety bonds are the safer, more taxpayer-friendly
way to approach pretrial policy.51 The bail bonding industry has
also aggressively sought influence over state legislators in the
twentieth and twenty-first centuries—and with great success—
by way of multimillion-dollar lobbying efforts, campaign
donations, and an influential partnership between the American
Bail Coalition (ABC)52 and the American Legislative Council
(ALEC).53 The two groups have worked together to outline model
bills that ease supervision and regulation of bail bondsmen,
increase the courts’ responsibility in pursuing forfeitures, and
restrict the backing of pretrial services agencies while further
narrowing the eligibility requirements for participation in such
50 Pinto, supra note 18.
51 PHILLIPS, supra note 8, at 3–4; see JUSTICE POLICY INST., FOR BETTER OR
FOR PROFIT: HOW THE BAIL BONDING INDUSTRY STANDS IN THE WAY OF FAIR AND
EFFECTIVE PRETRIAL JUSTICE 26–35, 37–39 (2012), http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/
justicepolicy/documents/forbetterforprofit_executivesummaryfinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/9
QWT-DP5R].
52 The American Bail Coalition was formed to ensure the long-term growth and
sustainability of the surety bail industry in the United States. According to its website,
The American Bail Coalition is a trade association made up of national bail
insurance companies who are responsible for underwriting criminal bail
bonds throughout the United States of America. The Coalition also includes
affiliate bail agent members from across the United States. The Coalition’s
primary focus is to protect the constitutional right to bail by working with
local and state policymakers to bring best practices to the system of release
from custody pending trial.
About the American Bail Coalition, AM. BAIL COAL., http://www.americanbailcoalition.
org/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/LFH3-TLGA].
53 The American Legislative Exchange Council is a nonprofit organization of
conservative state legislators and private sector representatives that drafts and shares
model state-level legislation for distribution among state governments in the United States.
According to its website, ALEC “works to advance the fundamental principles of free-
market enterprise, limited government, and federalism at the state level through a
nonpartisan public-private partnership of America’s state legislators, members of the
private sector and the general public.” AUDREY AMREIN-BEARSLEY, RETHINKING
VALUE-ADDED MODELS IN EDUCATION: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON TESTS AND
ASSESSMENT-BASED ACCOUNTABILITY 73, n.3 (2014).
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programs.54 Disturbingly, since the formation of ABC and its
alliance with ALEC, the for-profit bail industry has flourished,
while rates of nonfinancial release have declined and bail
amounts have steadily risen.55
B. Alternatives to Money Bail
The most common forms of nonmonetized release in
state court are (1) release on recognizance, where the defendant
“signs a contract agreeing to appear in court for their hearing as
required”; (2) unsecured bonds, where a defendant “signs a
contract agreeing to appear in court . . . and accepting liability for
a set amount” should he or she fail to appear as required; (3)
conditional release, where an individual must honor certain
enumerated stipulations in order to remain out of jail pending
trial; and, (4) “[r]elease to pretrial services—[w]here available,”
a defendant may be subject to “supervis[ion] by a pretrial
services agency.”56 Notably, these nonfinancial forms of release
were only introduced in the last half-century after the
frequency with which poor defendants were detained pretrial
came under criticism.
Nationwide, judges, court administrators, and public
officials banned together in a concerted effort to develop an
approach to bail-setting that would eliminate the costly detention
of indigent individuals who pose no flight risk or danger to the
community. In New York City in 1961, the first step in this
direction was taken with the launch of the Manhattan Bail
Project.57 Conceptualized by the Vera Institute of Justice, and
in collaboration with the New York University School of Law,
volunteers interviewed defendants before arraignment, gathering
information about their connections to the community—relatives,
occupations, and places of residence.58 If the individual had
sufficient community ties, they were endorsed for release on
54 JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 51, at 32–33.
55 A survey of felony cases in the seventy-five most populous counties in the
United States showed that average bail amounts have increased by over $30,000 between
1992 and 2006, posing a serious concern for indigent populations involved in the criminal
justice system. Compare BRIAN A. REAVES & PHENY Z. SMITH, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 1992, at 20 tbl.15 (1995),
with THOMAS H. COHEN & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
FELONYDEFENDANTS IN LARGEURBANCOUNTIES, 2006, at 7 tbl.7 (2010).
56 NEAL, supra note 2, at 7.
57 MARION C. KATZIVE, NEW AREAS FOR BAIL REFORM: A REPORT ON THE
MANHATTAN BAIL REEVALUATION PROJECT 2 (1968), http://www.vera.org/sites/default/
files/resources/downloads/1497.pdf [https://perma.cc/U5D3-MDL8].
58 Id.
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recognizance to the court.59 The Manhattan Bail Project
demonstrated that released individuals with community ties
would return to court, regardless of whether they had been
required to post a bond.60
The groundbreaking success of the Project led reformers
nationwide to expect that pre-arraignment evaluations of
defendants would offset the inherent inequities of cash bail. By
1964, public support for such programs “indicate[d] a rapidly
growing consensus in favor of the proposition that pretrial
release without bail can be accorded to large numbers of accused
with significant benefits to the cause of justice and without
handicapping law enforcement or impairing public safety.”61 In
subsequent years, approximately one hundred jurisdictions in
about half the states received public appropriations and private
grants to reduce the unnecessary detention of defendants
pretrial, while legislation encouraging pretrial release without
bail was passed by Congress for the federal system, and by
thirteen state legislatures.62 Nevertheless, wealth-based systems
and pretrial detention stubbornly persisted, suggesting that any
large-scale reform of the system requires more than the adoption
of individualized pre-arraignment investigations.63
In Washington, D.C., courts no longer use cash bail as a
means of preventive detention, and the overwhelming majority
of individuals released make all of their required appearances
and avoid re-arrest pending trial.64 Today, D.C.’s pretrial
legislation “stipulates that [only] if no condition or combination
of conditions will ‘reasonably assure’ that a defendant does not
flee or pose a risk to public safety, ‘preventive detention’ can be
ordered.”65 Part of the success of D.C.’s pretrial system can be
attributed to the broad discretion afforded to judges to determine
59 Id.
60 Id.Of the 3505 individuals released on Vera recommendations during the three
years of the project, only 56—or 1.6%—failed to appear. Note, Administration of Pretrial
Release and Detention: A Proposal for Unification, 83 YALEL.J. 153, 154 n.2 (1973).
61 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VERA FOUND., INC., PROCEEDINGS AND INTERIM
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BAIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, at xv (1965),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Photocopy/355NCJRS.pdf.
62 See Bail Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, ch.1, § 202–210, 98 Stat.
1976, 1976–87 (1984) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–3151).
63 KATZIVE, supra note 57, at 3.
64 The D.C. Pretrial Services Agency: Lessons from Five Decades of Innovation
and Growth, 2 CASE STUDS. 1, 1–2 (2009), https://www.pretrial.org/download/pji-reports/
Case%20Study-%20DC%20Pretrial%20Services%20-%20PJI%202009.pdf [https://perma.
cc/8ZJL-E99B].
65 KIDEUK KIM & MEGAN DENVER, D.C. CRIME POLICY INST., A CASE STUDY
ON THE PRACTICE OF PRETRIAL SERVICES AND RISK ASSESSMENT IN THREE CITIES 3
(2011), http://docplayer.net/7545576-A-case-study-on-the-practice-of-pretrial-services-and-
risk-assessment-in-three-cities.html.
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whether to deny bail outright—and impose preventive detention
instead—based on concerns for public safety or the accused’s
perceived danger to the community.66 This sharply contrasts with
the bail laws governing judges in “right to bail” states, where a
judge cannot deny bail unless a person is charged with a capital
crime.67 In these states, intentionally setting bail in high
amounts and hoping the accused cannot afford to pay it is the
only way a judge can detain individuals believed to pose a
danger to the community.68
Just a small minority of jurisdictions have replaced
monetized bail with risk assessment,69 and only four states—
Illinois, Kentucky, Oregon, and Wisconsin—have eliminated
“commercial bail bonds, relying instead on systems that require
deposits to courts instead of payments to private businesses, or
that simply trust defendants to return for trial.”70 Notably,
even in the few states where commercial bail bonds are now
outlawed, there remains a protracted struggle to get rid of
finances in pretrial policy; without a doubt, then, eliminating
the inequities of the bail system requires the complete removal
of finances from the bail-setting equation.71
II. WHO PAYS?
Inapposite to their intended use, wealth-based pretrial
practices have become the enabler of a costly and fragmented
system of justice—one that disproportionately targets the
66 See id. at 8.
67 “Most state constitutions include a right-to-bail provision, commonly phrased,
‘All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties except for [certain offenses] when the
proof of guilt is evident or the presumption great.’” Ariana Lindermayer, What the Right
Hand Gives: Prohibitive Interpretations of the State Constitutional Right to Bail, 78
FORDHAM L. REV. 267, 267 (2009) (alteration in original). The constitutions of Alabama,
California, Florida, Maine, Mississippi, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island,
South Dakota, and Vermont allow either the legislature or the court to determine whether
to allow bail in the excepted cases. Id. at 290–97. Courts in Arizona, Colorado,
Pennsylvania, and the Virgin Islands have held that bail is precluded for certain cases if
there is strong evidence against the defendant or a presumption. Id. at 298–300.
68 See Ryan, supra note 35, at 544.
69 See Wiggins & Marimow, supra note 28 (noting the handful of jurisdictions
which have attempted to reduce their reliance on monetized conditions of release by
adopting risk assessment tools to guide judges’ bail decisions).
70 See Liptak, supra note 41.
71 See, e.g., Santo, supra note 3 (“For decades, Kentucky has been trying to
find an alternative [to cash bail]. . . . In 1976, Kentucky made it illegal to profit from
bail, effectively getting rid of commercial bondsmen. Instead, a statewide agency began
trying to determine a defendant’s flight risk and chance of being arrested again using a
tool called a risk assessment—a series of questions about a defendant’s history and
sometimes other social factors. Some defendants were assigned risk scores, which
judges could consider when setting bail. It was a radical approach at the time, yet jails
continued to fill with defendants unable to afford bail.”).
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indigent accused while simultaneously driving their families and
communities deeper into debt and further along the margins of
society. And while the monetization of liberty and fairness is
implicitly offensive, the problem with the cash bail system
involves more than illusory notions of justice or equity. Indeed,
the needless arrest and incarceration of individuals charged
with low-level offenses does not just wreak havoc on the
personal lives and communities of the accused, it also comes at
a significant cost to taxpayers.
A. Taxpayers
The ABA has explained that “the taxpayer implications
of pretrial detention are significant given the expenses of
operating detention facilities,” while noting that New York City
spends nearly $45,000 per pretrial detainee each year.72 Of
course, some individuals are held without bail due to the nature
of their crime(s) or flight risk;73 however, taxpayer dollars and
city budgets are largely devoted to detaining low-level offenders
who pose no such risk.74
According to the United States Department of Justice,
housing pretrial detainees in state and local facilities costs
taxpayers roughly $9 billion annually.75 In New York City, one
report found that in 87% of cases where bail was fixed at $1000
or less, defendants could not afford bail and were therefore jailed
pending trial.76 The same year, the New York City Department
of Corrections spent a staggering $42 million to incarcerate
low-level defendants unable to afford bail.77 Similarly, officials
in Baltimore—a city with one of the largest jails in the country—
recently proposed the construction of a $181 million facility to
72 ABA STUDY, supra note 3, at 5.
73 Once a person has been arrested, there is a presumption that they will be
released pending the outcome of his or her case, unless the individual poses a danger to
persons or property or seems likely to flee. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951)
(“The right to release before trial is conditioned upon the accused’s giving adequate
assurance that he will stand trial and submit to sentence if found guilty.”). However, if
an individual is deemed to pose a safety risk or flight risk, then pretrial detention is
allowed. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751–55 (1987) (government’s
interest in public safety can outweigh an individual’s liberty interest). While the
Eighth Amendment prohibits excessive bail, the Constitution does not create an
absolute right to bail. Id. at 754–55.
74 Kennedy, supra note 14, at 3.
75 Holder, supra note 3.
76 JAMIE FELLNER, HUMAN RIGHTSWATCH, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM: BAIL AND
PRETRIAL DETENTION OF LOW INCOME NONFELONY DEFENDANTS IN NEW YORK CITY 2
(2010), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1210webwcover_0.pdf [https://per
ma.cc/9C4A-M5ZH].
77 Id. at 57.
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house the city’s burgeoning population of female pretrial
detainees, the majority of whom are charged with misdemeanor
or nonviolent offenses.78 Although it is difficult to accurately
assess the total cost nationwide, estimates suggest that
incarcerating pretrial populations in state and county jails
ranges anywhere from $46 million79 to $124 million80 annually.
To be sure, the price of incarcerating low-level pretrial
detainees is astounding in and of itself. The human cost is far
greater, however. No matter how brief, pretrial detention
increases defendants’ likelihood of conviction and probability of
recidivism, while negatively impacting their long-term
economic stability.
B. The Collateral Consequences for the Accused
The consequences of incarceration are clear for the
criminally convicted: relationships are disrupted, families suffer,
and invaluable opportunities for education and employment are
lost. Rarely emphasized, however, is the fact that innocent
individuals—people who have been found guilty of no crime—
also suffer these harms and are forced to languish in jail,
imprisoned because of their financial inability alone.
The stress of incarceration—or even just the threat of
jail time—frequently prompts defendants to plead guilty and
give up their right to trial. As one New York City judge told
Human Rights Watch, it “is a self-fulfilling system; defendants
have to plea, and end up with a record” which permanently
labels them as criminal, which in turn further influences judges
when setting bail in future cases.81 Virtually all individuals
charged with low-level offenses who face an unaffordable bail
amount end up accepting a plea, thereby absolving the state of
78 NASTASSIA WALSH, JUSTICE POLICY INST., WHEN MORE IS LESS: HOW A
LARGER WOMEN’S JAIL IN BALTIMORE WILL REDUCE PUBLIC SAFETY AND DIMINISH
RESOURCES FOR POSITIVE SOCIAL INVESTMENTS 2 (2011), http://www.justicepolicy.org/
uploads/justicepolicy/documents/11-01_fac_when_more_is_less_md-ac.pdf [https://perma.
cc/523G-JW4X].
79 See TEX. CRIMINAL JUSTICE COAL., BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS: ADULT CRIMINAL
JUSTICEDATA SHEET 1 (2016), https://www.texascjc.org/system/files/publications/Adult%2
0Bexar%20County%20Data%20Sheet%202016_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3Y8-KC9R] (noting
the average cost to Bexar County taxpayers to incarcerate the entire county jail pretrial
population per day was $100,536 in 2015).
80 UT Dallas Study to Help Curb Jail Costs, Cut Repeat Offenses, UNIV. OF TEX.
AT DALL. NEWS CTR. (Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.utdallas.edu/news/2011/12/1-14451_UT-
Dallas-Study-to-Help-Curb-Jail-Costs-Cut-Repeat_article-wide.html [https://perma.cc/YE
5Y-CKDQ] (explaining that Dallas County spends an estimated $124 million annually
alone on jail costs).
81 FELLNER, supra note 76, at 32 (quoting a Human Rights Watch Interview
with New York City judge whose name was withheld (June 18, 2010)).
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its burden to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt; “guilty
pleas account for [more than ninety-nine percent] of all
convictions of New York City misdemeanor defendants.”82
Former New York City Commissioner of Correction Martin Horn
succinctly described this dilemma: “Individuals who insist on
their innocence and refuse to plead guilty get held . . . . But the
people who choose to plead guilty get out faster.”83 And while
the plea might prevent detention altogether or at least allow a
return to productivity outside the jail cell, it may also come
with a criminal record.
In addition to the stress of incarceration itself, pretrial
detention harms individuals in other ways. For example, there
is a relationship between the amount of time spent behind bars
and economic stability, especially for low-risk defendants.84
Research indicates that, if not for the rise in rates of
incarceration, the number of individuals living in poverty in
the United States would decrease by as much as 20%.85
Notably, the economy more than doubled in the years leading
up to 2008, while the poverty rate remained fixed; at the same
time, incarceration rates grew by more than 300%: “from 111 to
491 per 100,000” citizens.86
Pretrial detention disrupts every aspect of the lives of
those detained—it can cause individuals to lose their homes or
spots in shelters,87 while others are completely barred from
receiving cash assistance or enrolling in the Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP).88 Moreover, high rates
82 Id. at 3.
83 PHILLIPS, supra note 8, at 3.
84 CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP ET AL., THE ARNOLD FOUND., THE HIDDEN
COSTS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION 3–4 (2013), http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/
uploads/2014/02/LJAF_Report_hidden-costs_FNL.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UWX-TWNR];
MARTINSCHÖNTEICH, OPENSOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE PRESUMPTION OFGUILT: THEGLOBAL
OVERUSE OF PRETRIAL DETENTION 3 (2014), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/
default/files/presumption-guilt-09032014.pdf [https://perma.cc/STU6-G8QQ].
85 Robert H. DeFina & Lance Hannon, The Impact of Mass Incarceration on
Poverty, 59 CRIME&DELINQUENCY 562, 581 (2013) (finding that the poverty rate in the
United States would have fallen by 20% between 1980 and 2004 if not for mass
incarceration and the criminal records that it generates).
86 Id. at 563.
87 See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, NO SECOND CHANCE: PEOPLE WITH
CRIMINAL RECORDS DENIED ACCESS TO PUBLIC HOUSING (2004); LEGAL ACTION CTR.,
AFTER PRISON: ROADBLOCKS TO REENTRY (2009).
88 Opting Out of the Federal Ban on Food Stamps and TANF, LEGAL ACTION
CTR., http://www.lac.org/toolkits/TANF/TANF.htm [https://perma.cc/9RA9-7V55]. Research
shows that benefits such as SNAP effectively reduce poverty and support working families.
See generally ARLOC SHERMAN ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, VARIOUS
SUPPORTS FOR LOW-INCOME FAMILIES REDUCE POVERTY AND HAVE LONG-TERM POSITIVE
EFFECTS ON FAMILIES AND CHILDREN (2013), http://www.cbpp.org/files/7-30-13pov.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H3GB-FH6F] (explaining that federal assistance programs like SNAP lift
millions of Americans out of poverty, create better health outcomes for children born to poor
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of incarceration are associated with depressed levels of civic
and political engagement among formerly jailed individuals and
their friends, family, and relations in the community.89
Especially in the context of low-level pretrial detainees, the
entrenched concept of permanent punishment in the United
States presents a particularly problematic obstacle to one’s
pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness.90 Even after release from
jail, individuals’ wages and long-term earning potential may be
diminished by their criminal records, while the ability to
meaningfully engage in democratic governance and political
processes is significantly curtailed, if not completely denied.
The fact that incarceration, unemployment, and reduced
earnings make both the present and future more economically
precarious—not just for the accused but also their families and
communities—only exacerbates these problems.91
C. The Collateral Victims
A study of households with a family member in jail or
prison found that approximately two-thirds struggle to meet
their most essential needs, and nearly 50% are unable to
purchase enough food or pay for housing.92 For one-third of
families who were living above the poverty line before making
contact with the criminal justice system, the expenses associated
with incarceration or jail-time—such as phone, commissary, and
travel costs—pushed them into debt.93 Moreover, some state
courts charge defendants who use public defenders, with fees
sometimes rising into the thousands of dollars, while others
might charge additional amounts for jury trials.94 Among those
surveyed, the average debt for court-related fines and fees alone
was $13,607—more than the $11,770 poverty line for individuals.95
parents, and eliminate the physiological stressors that impede children’s ability to learn and
succeed in school—outcomes that are associated with higher rates of employment and
earnings when children reach adulthood).
89 NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 29, at 7.
90 See generally THEDECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE pmbl. (U.S. 1776).
91 SANETA DEVUONO-POWELL ET AL., ELLA BAKER CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
WHO PAYS? THE TRUE COST OF INCARCERATION ON FAMILIES 9 (2015) (noting that “nearly
40% of all crimes are directly attributable to poverty and the vast majority (80%) of
incarcerated individuals are low-income”).
92 Id. at 7, 9.
93 Id. at 29–30.
94 Id. at 13–14.
95 Id. at 13, 25.
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D. The Case-Related Consequences
Being jailed increases the likelihood that individuals
will commit future crimes, substantially impacts defendants’
ability to assist attorneys in mounting competent defenses, and
encourages plea bargains—all of which increase the likelihood
that the accused will be convicted, imprisoned, and subjected to
an extended deprivation of liberty and justice as a sentenced
inmate.96
The pressure on pretrial detainees to plead guilty seems
a particularly apt explanation for how detention leads to
unfavorable case outcomes.97 An individual who is facing a
noncustodial sentence can be freed immediately after entering
a guilty plea, whereas refusing to accept a plea deal may mean
spending days, weeks, or months in jail.98 The pressure to
plead-out is undoubtedly a boon for prosecutors who “may be
less willing to offer post-arraignment plea bargains,” instead
opting to leverage “detention to encourage a guilty plea”—
thereby profiting from a defendant’s inability to make bail by
way of a conviction of more severe charges.99 Thus perpetuating
the inexorable entanglement of poverty with imprisonment,
harsh conviction charges “translate into more severe
sentences,” and sentencing may be further affected because the
defendant has not been allowed the chance to exhibit good
conduct while on pretrial release in the community.100
An exhaustive study of the impact of bail, in which a
decade of criminal cases were analyzed, revealed that in New
York City, 50% of bailed nonfelony defendants were convicted,
compared with 92% of those jailed pending trial.101 Among those
convicted, only 10% of the bailed defendants received prison
sentences, compared with 84% of defendants who spent the
entire pretrial period behind bars.102 Reflecting on this research,
analysts at the New York City Criminal Justice Agency
concluded that “[p]retrial detention had an adverse effect on
every case outcome that was examined.”103
There is also a proven connection between the length of
pretrial detention and the likelihood to recidivate. As the
defendant’s standing in the community becomes less stable with
96 PHILLIPS, supra note 8, at 115.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 117 fig.43.
102 Id. at 119 fig.44.
103 Id. at 115.
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each day of detention, it leads to an increase in risk for both
failure to appear and future criminal activity. For low- and
moderate-risk individuals,104 detention lasting even a few days is
strongly correlated with greater rates of criminal conduct both
during the period leading up to trial and “years after case
disposition”—“as length of pretrial detention increases up to 30
days, recidivism rates for low- and moderate-risk [individuals]
also increases significantly.”105 “When held 2-3 days,” low-level
defendants are nearly 40% more likely to engage in criminal
behavior pending trial than low-risk individuals detained for
less than 24 hours.106 Similarly, when held for more than a
week, those same low-risk individuals are 51% more likely to
engage in criminal misconduct in the 2 years following
“completion of their cases,” compared to “equivalent
[individuals] held no more than 24 hours.”107
Charged with state and local crimes, the financially-able
can afford to buy back their liberty and defend against criminal
accusations from a position of freedom, while the poverty-
stricken—unable to afford the price of justice—are forced to
remain in jail while awaiting case disposition. Sure enough,
studies demonstrate that those detained are less likely to have
their charges reduced and more likely to be convicted and
sentenced to jail time than their released counterparts.108 The
findings to support such phenomena suggest a “causal loop”
through which liberty and equal justice can perpetually evade
the poor defendant in court.109
Arguably, poverty is the sine qua non of not only the
exorbitant number of pretrial detainees currently flooding state
and county jails but also the reprehensible mass incarceration
that has become synonymous with criminal justice in the
United States.110
104 That is, individuals who have a low- to moderate-risk of failure to appear
and no new criminal activity pending trial.
105 LOWENKAMP ET AL., supra note 84, at 3.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 PHILLIPS, supra note 8, at 115.
109 Id.
110 See The Prison Crisis, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/prison-crisis [https://
perma.cc/UD9B-QYZY] (“With only 5% of the world’s population, the U.S. has more
than 20% of the world’s prison population—[making it] the world’s largest jailer. From
1978 to 2014, [its] prison population has risen 408%. One in 110 adults is incarcerated
in a prison or local jail in the U.S.; [t]his marks the highest rate of imprisonment in
American history.”).
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III. RECOGNIZING THE PROBLEM FORWHAT IT IS
Despite empirical data showing that bail is a poor
predictor of a defendant’s likelihood to appear, practices at the
state level largely continue to rely on outdated pretrial policies
that “discriminate[ ] against poor and middle-class defendants,”
do nothing for public safety, and usurp decisions that ought to be
made by the judiciary.111 Although the far-reaching consequences
of inequitable systems like cash bail are relatively easy to
identify, nowhere are they more pronounced than in minority and
urban communities that are already hindered by significant
social, economic, and public health crises.112
Even if defendants can afford the price of pretrial
release with the help of a bail bondsman, there is a great risk
of financial ruin when contracting with for-profit sureties. If
the bailed individual does not appear at trial, the bondsman is
responsible for finding and returning them to custody; if the
bonding agency is unable to locate the individual, it becomes
liable to the court for the whole amount; faced with the
prospect of lost profits, bondsmen turn to the individuals who
signed the bond, and “take whatever actions are necessary to
recover their costs.”113
Throughout the twentieth century, bail bonding was
particularly scrutinized as it neither “guarantees security to
society nor safeguards the right of the accused.”114 In 1927, for
111 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PRETRIAL RELEASE 45 (AM. BAR ASS’N
3d ed. 2007).
112 Precincts nationwide have embraced the “Broken Windows” approach to
policing—which is based on a theory that links disorderly behavior to the potential for
serious crime, and to urban decay in American cities. George L. Kelling & James Q.
Wilson, Broken Windows, ATLANTIC (Mar. 1982), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/
archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/?single_page=true [https://perma.cc/8RQL-9J9Y].
It encourages police presence in high-crime, low-income areas and the enforcement of
quality-of-life laws (arguably victimless offenses such as petty vandalism and turnstile
jumping) on the ground that if disorderly behaviors in public places are tightly controlled,
then a significant drop in violent crime will follow. Id. In theory, Broken Windows hinges on
“the gentle action of opinion and authority”; its authors believe “[i]t is rarely necessary to
arrest an aggressive drunk, a rowdy gang member, or a graffiti artist.” George L. Kelling &
James Q. Wilson, Decency, ATLANTIC (Nov. 2007), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/
archive/2007/11/decency/306292/ [https://perma.cc/6L3V-ZNEH]. In practice, Broken
Windows has proven to be incredibly ineffective at reducing violent crime, while arrests for
“order-maintenance” offenses are disproportionately concentrated in poor and minority
communities. Justin Peters, Loose Cigarettes Today, Civil Unrest Tomorrow: The Racist,
Classist Origins of Broken Windows Policing, SLATE (Dec. 5, 2014), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/crime/2014/12/edward_banfield_the_racist_classist_origins_of_
broken_windows_policing.html [https://perma.cc/3QAF-S63V].
113 Velázquez et al., supra note 44.
114 WAYNE H. THOMAS, JR., BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA 13 (1976) (quoting ARTHUR
L. BEELEY, THE BAIL SYSTEM IN CHICAGO 160 (1927)); see, e.g., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE PRETRIAL RELEASE, supra note 111, at 31 (noting that the bail system in 1968 was
“unsatisfactory from either the public’s or the defendant’s point of view. Its very nature
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example, Arthur L. Beeley published a thorough study of the
pretrial system in Chicago, observing that indigent defendants
remained in jail pretrial solely due to their inability to afford
“even small bail amounts”; bail bondsmen had grown too
powerful “in the administration of justice”; and “corruption and
a failure to pay bond forfeitures plagued the industry.”115 Later,
a 1954 survey of Philadelphia jails concluded:
One purpose for imposing a higher [bond] amount which would be
consistent with the theory of bail would be that the increase in the
defendant’s financial stake reduces the likelihood of non-appearance
at his trial. In practice, however, higher bail usually means that
appearance in court is being obtained by holding the defendant
behind bars.116
More than half a century later, the same issues remain at the
heart of the for-profit bail bond enterprise. While in 1966 the
system underwent significant reforms, and the federal
government has since shifted away from pretrial policies that
allow detention predicated upon financial inability alone, the
“causal loop” of race, poverty, and incarceration continues to
obstruct the administration of justice in state court, where cash
bail systems and predatory bail bonding companies remain
largely intact.117
Ultimately, bail-or-jail systems epitomize the notion of a
two-tiered system of justice in the United States.118 The
disparity between the purpose of bail in theory and the use and
effect of bail in current practice—where discretionary policies
and third party agents exploit low-income defendants and
distort judicial decision making—seems to fly in the face of the
constitutional safeguards to the equitable administration of
requires the practically impossible task of transmitting risk of flight into dollars and cents
and even its basic premise—that risk of financial loss is necessary to prevent defendants
from fleeing prosecution—is itself of doubtful validity. The requirement that virtually every
defendant must post bail causes discrimination against defendants and imposes personal
hardship on them, their families, and on the public which must bear the cost of their
detention and frequently support their dependents on welfare.”).
115 JUSTICE POLICY INST., supra note 51 (citing BEELEY, supra note 114, at 40).
116 Caleb Foote, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in
Philadelphia, 102 U. PENN. L. REV. 1031, 1033 (1954).
117 As discussed in greater detail in Section II.A, only four states have made illegal
the use of commercial sureties, and only a handful of jurisdictions have attempted to
increase the use of supervised release in place of detention.
118 The two-tiered system of justice in the United States has been defined as
“the way in which political and financial elites now enjoy virtually full-scale legal
immunity for even the most egregious lawbreaking, while ordinary Americans, especially
the poor and racial and ethnic minorities, are subjected to exactly the opposite treatment:
the world’s largest prison state and most merciless justice system.” Glenn Greenwald,
The Two-Tiered Justice System: An Illustration, SALON (Apr. 14, 2011), http://www.salon.
com/2011/04/14/justice_10/ [https://perma.cc/D79Z-UPQX].
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justice, as well as those due process liberties afforded the accused
which are so “‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,’
and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”119
A. Bailing Out Equal Protection
The rule that poverty and wealth have no place in
deciding whether an individual should remain in jail relies on
some of the most fundamental principles of American
jurisprudence.120 In general, the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits “punishing a person for his
poverty.”121 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has upheld the
protection of certain rights of the indigent defendant throughout
the critical stages of the American adversarial system. For
example, the indigent accused is allowed an attorney during
interrogation,122 they are provided an attorney during trial,123 and
guaranteed equal treatment in the appeals process.124
Additionally, defendants cannot be imprisoned solely because of
their inability to afford the price of freedom through the payment
of a fine, where punishment is otherwise limited to payment of a
fine for those able to afford it.125
Surprisingly, though, courts had remained virtually
silent in the face of mounting evidence of the discriminatory
impact that wealth-based pretrial policies have upon the
indigent accused.126 Until 2015, the question of whether cash-
119 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (internal citations
omitted) (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality
opinion); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
120 See Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 241 (1970) (“[T]he Court has had
frequent occasion to reaffirm allegiance to the basic command that justice be applied
equally to all persons.”); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355 (1963) (condemning
the “evil” of “discrimination against the indigent”); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19
(1956) (“There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on
the amount of money he has.”).
121 Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 671 (1983).
122 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
123 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (felonies); Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (misdemeanors).
124 Griffin, 351 U.S.; Douglas, 372 U.S. at 355; Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477
(1963); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963).
125 Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 397–99 (1971); Williams, 399 U.S. at 240–41;
Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 709 (1961).
126 Foote, supra note 6, at 959. In Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951), the Court
stated that the standard for determining cash bail is the amount “usually fixed for
serious charges of crimes”; if any greater amount is required, “that is a matter to which
evidence should be directed in a hearing so that the constitutional rights of each
petitioner may be preserved.” Id. at 6. In a concurring opinion, Justice Jackson noted
that if extraordinarily high bail is set solely to detain the accused pretrial, “it is
contrary to the whole policy and philosophy of bail.” Id. at 10 (Jackson, J., concurring).
He then added: “This is not to say that every defendant is entitled to such bail as he
can provide, but he is entitled to an opportunity to make it in a reasonable amount.” Id.
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based pretrial systems deny poor defendants equal protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment remained largely unanswered
by the United States. The silence came to a historic and abrupt
end in January 2015, when the United States Department of
Justice filed a statement of interest127 in the case of Varden v.
City of Clanton.128 In a watershed moment for the American
criminal justice system, the United States announced its official
position that “[i]ncarcerating individuals solely because of their
inability to pay for their release . . . violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”129 In June 2015, the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri
followed suit, issuing an injunction in Pierce v. City of Velda
City, thereby ending the defendant city’s use of a bail scheme
that required arrestees to pay a secured cash bond130 in a fixed
dollar amount for each offense charged to gain pretrial release.131
The Velda City court’s landmark ruling that “[n]o
person may, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, be
held in custody after an arrest because the person is too poor to
post a monetary bond”132 extended the precept that “[t]here can
be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends
on the amount of money he has”133 to postarrest procedure and
The Court seems to imply in dictum that bail set at “average amount is reasonable,”
and that an individualized analysis “is required only for amounts greater than the
average.” Foote, supra note 6, at 995. “Yet the effect of Stack v. Boyle is to” allow judges
to develop such scales as they deem appropriate, and evidence shows “that this is in
fact what has been done.” Id.
127 See Statement of Interest of the U.S. at 1, Varden v. City of Clanton, No.
2:15–cv–34–MHT–WC (M.D. Ala. Feb. 13, 2015). The United States has authority to
file Statements of Interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 517, which permits the attorney
general “to attend to the interests of the United States” in any case pending in a federal
court. 28 U.S.C. § 517 (2012). The United States can enforce the rights of the incarcerated
pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997a (2012). The United States uses that statute to address unconstitutional
conditions of confinement, many of which are caused by the overcrowding of prisons and
jails.
128 Statement of Interest of the U.S., supra note 127, at 1 (stating that the use
of secured bail schedules to detain the indigent “not only violates the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, but also constitutes bad public policy”).
129 Id.
130 Secured cash bonds are cash or surety payments made in the full amount
imposed by the court. See MICHAEL R. JONES, PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., UNSECURED
BONDS: THE AS EFFECTIVE AND MOST EFFICIENT PRETRIAL RELEASE OPTION 3 (2013),
http://www.pretrial.org/download/research/Unsecured+Bonds,+The+As+Effective+and+M
ost+Efficient+Pretrial+Release+Option+-+Jones+2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/AR98-XY7Q].
131 Order at 1, Pierce v. City of Velda City, No. 4:15-cv-570-HEA (E.D. Mo. June
3, 2015), http://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Velda-City-Final-
Judgment-and-Injunction.pdf [https://perma.cc/VPJ5-X2BV].
132 Id.
133 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
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pretrial imprisonment.134 Shortly thereafter, a September 2015
ruling out of the United States District Court for the Middle
District of Alabama, Northern Division, in the case of Varden v.
City of Clanton, once again declared unconstitutional the use of
money bail to detain poor defendants pretrial.135 In November
2015, in Thompson v. Moss Point, Mississippi, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi,
Southern Division held that the use of money bail violates the
Equal Protection Clause.136
Velda City and its progeny unequivocally declared that
the role of finances in state and local criminal procedure is
discriminatory, unjust, and unconstitutional. Such practices
have no place in the United States, where the Supreme Court
has made clear that “[i]n our society liberty is the norm, and
detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited
exception.”137 And while the Velda City line of cases provided
much-needed media attention and a renewed legitimacy for the
decades-old movement to rid American courts of the scourge of
cash bail, the fight against wealth-based pretrial practices is
far from finished.
B. Piecemeal Reform in the States
In 1962, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy called
upon practitioners, law students, and state bar associations to
join in the movement for large-scale bail reform, noting that
“[i]f justice is priced in the market place, individual liberty will
be curtailed and respect for law diminished.”138 At the time,
federal courts regularly deployed cash bail schemes similar to
the one abolished in Pierce v. Velda City: bail was determined
based on a bail schedule, and judges often set bail amounts
that many individuals “simply could not afford to pay.”139
At present, however, federal law expressly prohibits
that practice: “The judicial officer may not impose a financial
134 See, e.g., Order, supra note 131, at 1; Order at 5, Cooper v. City of Dothan,
No. 1:15–CV–425–WKW (M.D. Ala. June 18, 2015) (ordering the defendant city to release
the plaintiff under lawful nonfinancial conditions).
135 Opinion at 7–8, Varden v. City of Clanton, No. 2:15–cv–34–MHT-WC (M.D.
Ala. Sept. 14, 2015).
136 Declaratory Judgment at 1, Thompson v. Moss Point, No. 1:15cv182LG–
RHW (S.D. Miss. Nov. 6, 2015).
137 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
138 Robert F. Kennedy, U.S. Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Address to the American
Bar Association House of Delegates 7 (Aug. 6, 1962), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/
files/ag/legacy/2011/01/20/08-06-1962%20Pro.pdf [https://perma.cc/QN59-U3B7].
139 Statement of Interest of the U.S., supra note 127, at 4–5.
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condition that results in the pretrial detention of the person.”140
Introduced as part of the Bail Reform Act of 1966, the law
requires that federal judges and magistrates consider a
defendant’s ties to the community, employment, and prior record,
and, “[i]n weighing these factors, judges are to consider 1) the
extent to which pre-trial release will endanger the safety of those
in the community, and 2) what is necessary to reasonably assure
that the defendant will return to court when necessary.”141 But
while the federal courts have long since operated under a system
of presumptive release, few state legislatures have followed suit.
At best, the federal bail reform legislation affects only a relatively
small number of defendants.142 The much bigger, more persistent
problem is that of bail in state and local court.143
In recent years, however, dozens of cities and states
throughout the country have begun to explore risk-based
alternatives to bail. For example, New Mexico voters approved
an amendment in November 2016 that prevents judges from
jailing low-risk defendants who cannot make bail if they pose
little threat to community safety and are likely to appear for
court.144 New Jersey’s Bail Reform and Speedy Trial Act, effective
January 2017, “largely eliminate[s] bail for minor crimes” by
using a risk assessment tool to help judges determine whether
the accused will be released pretrial.145 In February 2017, the
Maryland Court of Appeals adopted a bail-setting procedure that
140 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(B)(xiv)(2) (2012).
141 Statement of Interest of the U.S., supra note 127, at 6 (citing 18 U.S.C.
§ 3142(b)–(d) (2012) and noting that such statutory provisions “outlin[e] factors the
courts must consider in determining whether or not to hold a defendant over until trial,
or release him or her on his or her own recognizance or pursuant to conditions” of
release, id. at 6 n.17 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b)–(d))).
142 On the federal level, mass incarceration is not an issue; of the approximately
2.2. million defendants currently incarcerated in this country, fewer than 1 in 10 is being
held in a federal facility. See DANIELLE KAEBLE ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2014, at 17 app. tbl.1 (2015),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus14.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PUE-MA9D]. In
addition, the federal court system relies upon a pretrial process that heavily favors
pretrial release: a court “must resolve all doubts regarding the propriety of release in the
defendant’s favor.” United States v. Sanchez-Martinez, No. 13–cr–00236–JLK, 2013 WL
3662871, at *5 (D. Colo. July 12, 2013) (quoting United States v. Morales, No 11-cr-20132-
09-KHV-DJW, 2012 WL 603520, at *1 (D. Kan. Feb. 24, 2012)); United States v. Gebro,
948 F.2d 1118, 1121 (9th Cir. 1991) (Pretrial release should be denied “only in rare
circumstances.”).
143 See KAEBLE ET AL., supra note 142, at 17 app. tbl.1 (showing the total amount
of persons supervised by U.S. adult correctional systems as 6,814,600, with only 338,000 of
those individuals in custody of the federal government.).
144 An-Li Herring, States and Cities Take Steps to Reform Dishonest Bail
System, NPR (Dec. 17, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/12/17/505852280/states-and-cities-
take-steps-to-reform-dishonest-bail-system [https://perma.cc/93SW-M8ND].
145 Pretrial Justice, MD. ALL. FOR JUSTICE REFORM, http://www.ma4jr.org/
pretrial-justice/ [https://perma.cc/Y7EN-TSEP].
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is nearly identical to that of the federal system.146 And in
March 2017, the state attorney for Cook County, Illinois,
implemented a policy where state attorneys actively support
the release of pretrial detainees who are unable to afford bonds
of $1000 or less.147
Closer to home, officials in New York City unveiled a
plan to create a pretrial services system for defendants charged
with low-level offenses.148 Shortly thereafter, the Mayor’s Office
of Criminal Justice announced the development of an online bail
payment system that can help reduce costly and unnecessary
incarceration in New York City by making it easier for cash-
strapped defendants to post bail and secure their pretrial
release.149 By making online bail payment available, defendants
will no longer need to have someone present at their
arraignments “who can pay the bail immediately [and] in cash.”150
Instead, defendants’ friends and families can quickly pay online;
easing the process for paying bail ensures that individuals do not
spend unnecessary time behind bars and restores the
presumption of innocence pretrial.151 Common-sense reforms like
pretrial services and the online bail payment system represent
significant—albeit long overdue—steps toward a fairer criminal
justice system for all New Yorkers. Overhauling the current bail
system—rather than eliminating cash bail in its entirety—has
significant drawbacks, however, and the city’s piecemeal
remedies may be just as bad as the disease.
In pretrial programs, defendants are released and
referred to an agency that imposes certain conditions on their
release.152 Failure to comply with their conditions of release can
lead to fines, incarceration, and other penalties.153 The
problem—as noted by Robin Steinberg and David Feige in their
respective capacities as executive director of The Bronx
146 Judicial Rules, MD. ALL. FOR JUSTICE REFORM, http://www.ma4jr.org/
judicial-rules/ [https://perma.cc/HE8E-EDK6].
147 Emily Hoerner & Jeanne Kuang, Cook County Prosecutor to Seek Release of
Defendants Locked Up on Low Bonds, INJUSTICE WATCH (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.
injusticewatch.org/news/2017/cook-county-prosecutor-to-support-release-of-defendants-
jailed-on-low-bonds/ [https://perma.cc/CQU7-CJ2F].
148 See Keshner, supra note 22.
149 Press Release, NYC Office of the Mayor, Mayor de Blasio Announces Online
Bail Payment, Helping to Reduce Unnecessary Jail Time (Nov. 1, 2016), http://www1.nyc.
gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/858-16/mayor-de-blasio-online-bail-payment-helping-reduce-
unnecessary-jail-time [https://perma.cc/TX3S-Z83P].
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152 See Keshner, supra note 22.
153 Robin Steinberg & David Feige, The Problem with NYC’s Bail Reform, THE
MARSHALL PROJECT (July 9, 2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/07/09/the-
problem-with-nyc-s-bail-reform [https://perma.cc/3LAT-2E9G].
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Defenders and board chair of the Bronx Freedom Fund—is that
these pretrial “services” are often indistinguishable from, and
occasionally far more burdensome than, the sentence one might
receive upon a finding of guilt.154 Pretrial programs thus imitate
the exact problem they seek to address: “inverting innocent until
proven guilty, and placing punishment before adjudication.”155
Steinberg and Feige further note, and data provided by
the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services
confirm, that the large majority of arrests made by the New
York City Police Department are for quality-of-life offenses.156
These are the very same arrests—for arguably victimless
crimes such as petty vandalism and turnstile jumping—that
are disproportionately concentrated in poor communities of
color.157 Thus, the same people from these overpoliced and
underserved communities will most often be eligible for
participation in the new pretrial supervision scheme.158 And
while this might sound good in theory, it can be an
overwhelming inconvenience for those participating in such
programs, many of whom are “struggling to get by, working two
jobs with inflexible hours while juggling childcare and other
responsibilities. For them, the bureaucratic necessitates of
compliance can become terribly destabilizing.”159
Before implementing a new pretrial regime that further
entrenches governmental control over disadvantaged
communities, lawmakers ought to consider whether these reforms
are in fact desirable and upon whom their burdens will fall. So
long as we continue to arrest and prosecute people for victimless
quality-of-life crimes, “it will be important to ease the
burdens . . . face[d] while awaiting trial.”160 Thus, although
proposed with the best of intentions, pretrial supervision
programs threaten to undercut this objective. And it would be a
shame if the sincere desire to assuage the unnecessary harm
caused by our current approach to criminal justice led to the
creation of “a new system larded with the same old flaws.”161
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id. To add some additional perspective, in 2013 alone, the New York City
Police Department arrested more than 350,000 people. Adult Arrests by County:
Beginning 1970, N.Y. STATE, https://data.ny.gov/Public-Safety/Adult-Arrests-by-County-
Beginning-1970/rikd-mt35 [https://perma.cc/JB9Q-RDRP].
157 See Peters, supra note 112.
158 Steinberg & Feige, supra note 153.
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IV. THE SOLUTION
For policymakers and the body politic alike, the most
salient feature of the broken criminal justice system lies in the
intersection of poverty, race, and incarceration.162 In communities
of concentrated social and economic hardship, state and local
governments have launched an unprecedented intensification of
police presence and criminal law enforcement.163 Of course, no one
can reasonably argue that cities should turn a blind eye to
disorderly and disruptive public behavior. Increasingly,
162 According to the ABA, researchers estimate that anywhere from 60%–90%
of criminal defendants need publicly-funded attorneys, depending on the jurisdiction.
MAREA BEEMAN, AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT
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(2012), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_
defendants/ls_sclaid_def_sustaining_and_improving_public_defense.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/56GF-AAVK]; BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
CONTRACTING FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES: A SPECIAL REPORT 3 n.1 (2000), https://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/181160.pdf [https://perma.cc/NM7H-SW2F] (stating that 60%–
90% of all cases involve indigent defendants and thus use court-appointed counsel); see also
Lauren-Brooke Eisen, Paying for Your Time: How Charging Inmates Fees Behind Bars
May Violate the Excessive Fines Clause, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (July 31, 2014)
(noting that indigent individuals, “along with racial and ethnic minorities” are
“disproportionately represented” among the jail and prison population); Harry J. Holzer
et al., The Economic Costs of Poverty in the United States: Subsequent Effects of Children
Growing Up Poor 1 (Nat’l Poverty Ctr., Working Paper No. 07-04, 2007) (exploring the
“statistical relationships between children growing up in poverty and their earnings,
propensity to commit crime, and quality of health later in life”); PHILLIPS, supra note 8, at
118, 128, 130 (stating, “Pretrial detention significantly increased the likelihood of a jail or
prison sentence, in addition to raising the likelihood of being convicted in the first place”
and that “[e]quity would require that the poor have the same chance for pretrial release
(which is related to their chance of a positive case outcome) as the rich; that cannot
happen as long as money bail is used to determine who is released and who is not”
(emphasis omitted)). Across party lines, there is widespread recognition of the need for
criminal justice reform in the United States. See, e.g., Donald Cohen, An Unprecedented
View of America’s Criminal Justice System, HUFF. POST (Jan. 21, 2016), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/donald-cohen/an-unprecedented-view-of_b_9039962.html [https://
perma.cc/9CS2-SJWB]; Craig DeRoche, The Time Is Now for Bipartisan Criminal Justice
Reform, FOX NEWS (Jan. 28, 2016), http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2016/01/28/time-is-
now-for-bipartisan-criminal-justice-reform.html [https://perma.cc/LV2F-EWVG]; Alice
Miranda Ollstein, Clinton and Sanders Call Out America’s Racist Criminal Justice
System, THINK PROGRESS (Jan. 17, 2016), http://thinkprogress.org/politics/2016/01/17/374
0372/dem-debate-racism-criminal-justice/ [https://perma.cc/9EJE-A4AD]; Ben Geier, Why
Rand Paul’s Debate Comments on Race, Prisons Make Him a GOP Outlier, FORTUNE
(Jan. 29, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/01/29/rand-paul-race-criminal-justice-republican-
debate/ [https://perma.cc/7HWP-WQ5W].
163 See Marie Gottschalk, It’s Not Just the Drug War, JACOBIN (Mar. 5, 2015),
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/03/mass-incarceration-war-on-drugs/ [https://perma.
cc/2WPY-VFUJ] (In addition to the War on Drugs, other important factors contributing to
the increase in the prison population were how, “beginning in the 1970s, police,
prosecutors, judges, and parole boards read the political tea leaves and started to exert
their enormous discretion in a more punitive way. In the 1980s and 1990s, legislators
began piling on tougher sanctions across the board. These included not only stiffer
punishments for drug offenses but also the proliferation of mandatory minimums, three-
strikes laws, truth-in-sentencing legislation, draconian sex offender measures, mandatory
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however, these harsh responses to minor law-breaking come at
far too great a cost.
Ultimately, laws dictating criminal procedure and
punishment should not be determined solely by evaluating an
individual’s risk of flight or weighing indicia of public safety, nor
should they be singly motivated by the want for retribution.164
Similarly, successful bail-setting policies cannot be governed by
analyses of cost and benefit alone.165 Instead, the fair
administration of justice requires a holistic approach—one that
considers the liberty and equality implications of cash bail and
pretrial detention while accounting for the safety and stability
of those jailed, as well as that of the families and communities to
which they will eventually return. Furthermore, because the
legitimate authority of the state to deprive an individual of their
natural right to liberty166 is rooted in social contract theory,167
164 Punishment—Theories of Punishment, LEGAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://law.jrank.
org/pages/9576/Punishment-THEORIES-PUNISHMENT.html [https://perma.cc/XE5W-
DKD9] (“Theories of punishment can be divided into two general philosophies: utilitarian
and retributive. The utilitarian theory of punishment seeks to . . . discourage, or ‘deter,’
future wrongdoing. The retributive theory seeks to punish offenders because they deserve to
be punished. . . . Where the utilitarian theory looks forward by basing punishment on social
benefits, the retributive theory looks backward at the transgression as the basis for
punishment.”).
165 See, e.g., John Roman, Cost-Benefit Analyses of Criminal Justice Reforms,
NAT’L INST. JUS. J., Sept. 2013, at 30, 32, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/241929.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5FCD-LP6A] (acknowledging the basic economic principle of supply
and demand; noting that “[t]here is no market for crime . . . [and] [n]o one chooses to be
victimized”; and, focusing instead on cost-benefit in the areas of criminal law where there is
a defined marketplace—measuring, inter alia, “whether changes in sentencing practices and
the costs of more imprisonment are offset by crime reduction due to incapacitation and
deterrence”).
166 Natural rights are not contingent upon the laws, customs, or beliefs of any
particular culture or government, and are thusly universal and inalienable. See generally
The Declaration of Independence and Natural Rights, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOUND.,
http://www.crf-usa.org/foundations-of-our-constitution/natural-rights.html [https://perma.
cc/8SRX-NGSJ]. Although the idea of natural rights has been asserted as justifying
various ideologies, legal philosophers have consistently recognized the right to liberty as
paramount. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175, 175
(1955) (stating that “if there are any moral rights at all, it follows that there is at least
one natural right, the equal right of all men to be free”); T.H. GREEN, LECTURES ON THE
PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION 114 (Batoche Books 1999) (1895) (arguing that “if
there are such things as rights at all, then, there must be a right to life and liberty, or, to
put it more properly to free life”); JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OFGOVERNMENT, ch. II,
§ 6 (1690) (emphasizing that “no-one ought to harm anyone else in his life, health, liberty,
or possessions”); THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (Thomas
Jefferson, wrote, “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among
these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”).
167 The social contract theory, first recognized by Thomas Hobbes in the fifteenth
century, is grounded in the belief that humans instinctively operate out of self-interest, and
so it is, therefore, both natural and rational to sacrifice some individual liberty in exchange
for some common security by way of a mutual agreement with others. THOMAS HOBBES,
LEVIATHAN 77–80 (Rod Hay ed., McMaster Univ. 1999) (1651). Hobbes argued that the
natural state of the man unbound by government is war, and so the social contract
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sound policies governing crime and punishment must not only be
empirically grounded but also reflective of the normative
principles that purportedly underpin the use of incarceration in
the United States.168
While there has been a renewed push for bail reform in
the United States, a meaningful discussion of the principles
underlying the practice of bail-setting and use of pretrial
detention has been notably absent. As vindication and crime
reduction are emphasized, the attitudes that once limited
discretionary abuses of power and the excessive punishment have
been forgotten and, as a result, bails are set even higher, and
sentences are even more severe. Yet a pragmatic insight into the
role of incarceration in an ordered society would recognize that
the denial and deprivation of individual liberty and equal justice
are the harshest penalties a civilization can impose.
CONCLUSION
The sheer surfeit of harms caused by cash bail ought to
arouse the suspicion that something is seriously amiss with the
states’ approaches to criminal procedure. Studies spanning six
decades have firmly established that the denial of liberty pretrial
has plea-inducing and criminogenic effects;169 that pretrial
incarceration as a result of poverty alone “so pervades our system
that for a majority of defendants accused of anything more serious
than petty crimes, the bail system operates” as an outright denial
of liberty;170 and, that “there is an extraordinary correlation
between pretrial status (jail or bail) and the severity of the
requires that individuals forego certain liberties in exchange for the common security
provided by an absolute ruler. THOMAS HOBBES, PHILOSOPHICAL RUDIMENTS CONCERNING
GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY 16–28 (London, John Bohn 1845) (1649); HOBBES, supra, at 77–
80. Generally speaking, John Locke’s contemporary iteration of the social contract proposes
a more democratic approach to ordered society and takes a position on mankind not quite so
grim as that of Hobbes. Locke argued that, by acquiescing to the social contract, individuals
impliedly consent to the creation of a political system of governance through which they
gain the protection of laws, judges to adjudicate those laws, and the executive power
necessary for their enforcement. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OFGOVERNMENT 174–75
(Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2006) (1689).
168 NAT’LRESEARCHCOUNCIL, supra note 29, at 8 n.1 (“Political theorists and legal
analysts have often observed that public policy necessarily embodies ethical judgments
about means or ends. These judgments are informed by normative principles: basic ideals or
values—often embedded in history, institutions, and public understanding—that offer a
yardstick by which good governance is measured.”); EVALUATION IN PLANNING: FACING THE
CHALLENGE OF COMPLEXITY 231 (Nathaniel Lichfield et al. eds., 1998) (noting that “policy
evaluation is a normative pursuit where ends and means are intertwined. The idea of
generating objective ‘best’ alternatives by applying logical reasoning to valid premises and
clear, quantifiable objects is a fallacy.”).
169 Foote, supra note 6, at 959–60.
170 Id. at 960.
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sentence after conviction.”171 Apart from their numerosity, the
more fundamental flaw in the states’ varied bail-setting
methods is that they have nothing to do with the traditions and
texts through which this nation first declared its independence
from absolutism and sought to “establish Justice” and “secure
the Blessings of Liberty.”172
Combined with the unprecedented increase in arrests
and incarceration seen in the last half century,173 the shift in
pretrial policy and bail-setting has imposed a range of unwanted
social and financial costs, and the resultant degree of crime-
preventing benefits remains largely unknown. Those high-
sounding platitudes of democratic governance, claiming liberty
for all and that justice is blind, ring incredibly hollow upon the
realization that the very laws from which we seek protection are
those which have institutionalized the inequity of cash bail and
allowed the predatory bail bondsman’s discretion to replace
that of the prudent magistrate. What is most confounding is
why—or how—we, as political beings, have lost sight of this
blatant and catastrophic discrimination, seen so early in
American history and highlighted time and again throughout
the last century. Reflecting on the anomalies he observed in
America in 1835, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote:
[N]o man can entirely shake off the influence of the past; and the
settlers, unintentionally or involuntarily, mingled habits and notions
derived from their education and from the traditions of their country
with those habits and notions which were exclusively their own. . . .
I shall quote a single example to illustrate what I advance.
The civil and criminal procedure of the Americans has only two
means of action,—committal or bail. The first measure taken by the
magistrate is to exact security from the defendant, or, in case of
refusal, to incarcerate him: the ground of the accusation and the
importance of the charges against him are then discussed.
It is evident that a legislation of this kind is hostile to the poor
man, and favorable only to the rich. The poor man has not always a
security to produce, even in a civil cause: and if he is obliged to wait
for justice in prison, he is speedily reduced to distress. The wealthy
171 Id.
172 U.S. CONST. pmbl.
173 See generally William J. Stuntz, Unequal Justice, 121 HARV. L. REV 1969
(2008) (arguing that states responded to the Warren Court’s defendants’ rights revolution
with laws that toughened sentencing and defined crime more broadly, leading to more jail
time and more arrests, which disproportionately affected poor and minority communities.
Adding to the focus on the poor, Stuntz notes, was prosecutors’ decision to use their
discretion to negotiate guilty pleas with public defenders—prosecutors could sift through
the broader array of criminal charges and sentences passed by legislators to make deals,
taking many easy guilty pleas from poor defendants.).
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individual, on the contrary, always escapes imprisonment in civil
causes . . . . So that all the penalties of the law are, for him, reducible
to fines. Nothing can be more aristocratic than this system of
legislation. Yet in America it is the poor who make the law, and they
usually reserve the greatest social advantages to themselves. The
explanation of the phenomenon is to be found in England; the laws of
which I speak are English, and the Americans have retained them,
however repugnant they may be to the tenor of their legislation and
the mass of their ideas.174
The failure of our justice system to preserve the liberty of
the accused lies in an unrelenting reliance on—and blindness
to—policies which disregard normative principles of fairness and
just deserts, focus only on analytical elements of imprisonment
and cost-benefit analyses, and are tailored to the needs of a
society whose values are vastly different from our own. The
solution lies in recognition of this fact, and the responsibility
rests, as it should, on the American legal community.
Speaking to the Criminal Law Section of the American Bar
Association in 1964, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy said:
No generation of lawyers has yet failed its responsibility to the law
or to our society. The role of the lawyer in De Tocqueville’s time
prompted him to say that “I cannot believe that a republic could
hope to exist at the present time if the influence of lawyers in public
business did not increase in proportion to the power of the people.”
Let us today continue to accept that challenge, whether in
private practice or public service. Let us see to it that for all our
citizens, criminal law means criminal justice.175
More than fifty years later, Kennedy’s words ring truer than
ever, and the need for meaningful criminal justice reform
remains. When incarceration has become so grossly overused
even though less severe alternatives might achieve better
individual and social outcomes, it is due time to rethink the way
poor defendants are treated in our communities and in our
courts. A system that makes less use of detention will better
achieve crime prevention and encourage equality and civic
engagement than a harsher, more punitive system that deprives
individuals of meaningful citizenship, opportunities for growth,
and personal freedom.
174 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 40–41 (Henry Reeve
trans., 3d ed. 1839) (footnotes omitted).
175 Kennedy, supra note 37, at 7; see also Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, Speech at the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers 57th Annual
Meeting and 13th Criminal Justice Network Conference (Aug. 1, 2014), https://www.
justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-speaks-national-association-criminal-
defense-lawyers-57th [https://perma.cc/F9EE-8VHH] (quoting Kennedy, supra).
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So the problem is not new. What is new, however, is the spirit in
which we approach it now. We live in a time of growing concern all
over the country that the scales of our legal system measure justice,
not wealth. And it has been my hope that we could bring new
energies to this momentum and find solutions to the problem.176
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